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Examination of the Interrelationship
Among the Software Industry Structure,
Keiretsu, and Japanese Intellectual
Property Protection for Software
Prepackaged software sales in Japan presently account for approximately fif-
teen percent of software industry revenues;' its U.S. counterpart receives seventy
percent of industry revenues. 2 In Japan, customized software has dominated the
software market.3 Given the fact that much of the current best-selling prepackaged
software in Japan is of U.S. origin, 4 the underdevelopment of the Japanese pre-
packaged segment becomes readily apparent. In the dominant custom segment,
the comparatively larger software firms are keiretsu5 companies, while most
companies in the prepackaged software segment do not belong to keiretsu. The
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1. Japan Information Service Industry Association [hereinafter JISA], Jyoho Service Sangyo
Hakusho 40 (1994) [hereinafter The White Paper 1994]. Because the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) supervised The White Paper 1994, it is a reliable resource regarding the Japanese
software industry; consequently, I cite heavily from this source. The fifteen percent ratio (of prepack-
aged software sales) has remained the same in the 1998 White Paper as well.
2. Robert P. Merges, A Comparative Look at Property Rights and the Software Industry, in THE
INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER SOFTWARE INDUSTRY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDUSTRY EVOLUTION
AND STRUCTURE 273 (David Mowery ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) [hereinafter Merges, SOFTWARE
INDUSTRY].
3. The White Paper, supra note 1, at 40. The software industry can be divided into two main
market segments: prepackaged software, sold "off the shelf" as a commodity product, and "custom
programming services," where a comparatively large software product is created for a particular
client. Merges, SOFTWARE INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 273.
4. Software Uriagedaka Ranking, NIKKEI PASOCON (Mar. 1992 & Mar. 1995).
5. Simply speaking, keiretsu is an industry group connected by reciprocal shareholdings.
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keiretsu structure is now in the midst of change due to the country's economic
distress, and Japanese companies are paying more attention to current profits
than to keiretsu ties.
In his new paper, Professor Robert Merges attributes the discrepancy in Japa-
nese custom and prepackaged software companies to the interrelationship between
comparatively weak intellectual property (IP) protection for software in Japan
and Japanese software industry structure. 6 Professor Merges initially notes that
legislative IP protection makes prepackaged software business feasible by replac-
ing individual contract negotiations. He also points out that strong IP rights attract
investment capital to firms where a copyright law protects software and software
companies own the copyright of software; investors can take the copyright of
companies' software in case of default. For example, investment companies can
sell or lease the software to another company to continue its development. Profes-
sor Merges then reasons that because Japanese software firms in the dominant
custom segment protect their software by implicit contracts with a few closely-
allied, particular customers (within the keiretsu) and not by legislative IP rights
protection, that Japan kept its legislative IP software protection weak to allow
Japanese software companies to appropriate foreign ideas at lower cost. Thus,
Professor Merges concludes that weak legislative IP protection has caused the
underdeveloped prepackaged software segment in Japan.7 Also, Merges states
that a keiretsu software company is locked in each keiretsu group partly because
6. Merges, SoFrWARE INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 275, 282, 286-87, & 290.
7. In the author's view, the business reasons accounting for the small market share of prepack-
aged software in Japan are the attitude of Japanese users, the hardware environment, and the difficulty
software companies experience obtaining financing. The mainframe market was so fragmented that
it gave insufficient incentives for developing prepackaged programs to software companies. Also,
Japanese customers with abundant funds preferred custom software both to satisfy their detailed
business needs and to differentiate themselves from competitors.
In the Japanese personal computer (PC) market, however, a dominant platform existed from the
mid-1980s, the NEC PC-98 (not IBM compatible), holding sixty percent of the market share. The
PC-98 drew a sizable number of prepackaged programs.
The most likely explanation for the small prepackaged software market in Japan is the limited size
of the NEC PC-98 market when compared with the IBM PC platform. On the demand side, the ratio
of PCs to mainframes was far smaller in Japan than in the United States, though prepackaged software
has been used for PCs even in Japan. Moreover, specialized word-processing machines, wahpros, were
popular and exceeded PCs in shipment until recently. On the supply side, even the PC-98 platform was
still too small to induce a shift to an investment-first, competitive prepackaged software business from
the lucrative and sizable custom business for mainframes. Custom software was constantly in short
supply until the early 1990s, and the market was four to seven times as large as the market for prepack-
aged software. Development of custom software was paid either by the hour regardless of the quality
and efficiency of the development work or by a lump sum payment upon attainment of certain milestones.
Customers guaranteed receipt of the developed software and software companies bear only operation
costs until the last payment by a customer. On the other hand, in the prepackaged business, companies
must not only bear development costs but also deal with the uncertainty of whether they can obtain
adequate revenues through sales and licensing upon completion.
To make "economies of scale to R&D" and timely reinvestment happen in an R&D-driven high-
technology industry, the existence of a sizable market is crucial. Further, "J-curve profits" due to
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if it left the keiretsu it would lose work from the other keiretsu group companies,
and partly because it would not be able to easily obtain financing.8
This article will: (1) show that some assumptions of Professor Merges' formula-
tion are incorrect; (2) convey a more realistic picture of the Japanese software
industry; and (3) explore the impact of the changing keiretsu structure on the
industry. Part I of this article examines Merges' keiretsu hypotheses; it also
explores the ongoing change of the keiretsu structure and its effects on the software
industry, taking into consideration the tough financing situation for Japanese
software companies. Part II analyzes the interrelationship between the IP rights
regime in Japan and its software industry structure. Finally, Part Il explains
Japanese IP software rights protection since the 1980s and analyzes whether it
has been weaker than that in the United States.
I. The Impact of the Keiretsu Structure on the
Japanese Software Industry
Most of the larger Japanese software companies are keiretsu companies whose
main business is the development of custom software. The basic attributes of the
keiretsu system include cross-holdings of shares by the companies accompanied
by implicit mutual agreements not to sell such reciprocally-held shares. Situated
at the center of a keiretsu is a main bank (a lead lender to the group), a large
industrial firm, and/or a large trading company.9
Section A describes the development of keiretsu software companies and the
traditional structure of keiretsu. Section B examines Professor Merges' hypothe-
ses that: (1) a keiretsu software company is locked in each keiretsu; and that (2)
implicit contracts in the dominant custom segment caused weak IP protection in
Japan. This section also analyzes the impact of the ongoing change of the keiretsu
structure on the software companies.
minimal production costs of programs boost the attractiveness of a sizable market to software compa-
nies. IBM PCs provided 'network externalities,' which accounted for the prosperity of the U.S.
software industry-the power of standardization through IBM machines (including its clones) and
MS-DOS. Unlike IBM, NEC did not adopt an open architecture policy, remaining hostile to clone
manufacturers. Moreover, while it sold IBM clones outside Japan, NEC did not try to bridge the
incompatibility with the IBM PC. The Japanese prepackaged software business was limited to the
NEC PC-98 platform: one-fourteenth of the worldwide IBM platform. Consequently, the NEC PC-98
platform gave far fewer incentives to Japanese software companies than the IBM PC platform did
to U.S. companies, especially when profitable and sizable custom business was abundant. For more
details, see Rieko Mashima, The Turning Point of Japanese Software Companies, 11 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 429 (1996) [hereinafter Mashima, Japanese Software Companies].
8. Interview with Robert P. Merges, Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University
of Califonia at Berkeley, in Berkeley, Cal. (July 20, 1995).
9. Only one-tenth of one percent of Japanese corporations belong to a keiretsu. However,
member firms account for approximately one-quarter of total corporate sales and paid-up capital of
all Japanese corporations, and represent one-half of all listed Japanese corporations. W. CARL KESTER,
JAPANESE TAKEOVERS: THE GLOBAL CONTEST FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 55 (1991).
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A. KEIRETSU SOFTWARE COMPANIES: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
During the 1960s, large banks and securities companies hired software engi-
neers to develop their information systems (daiichji on-line). On average, a system
department of a large commercial bank had approximately 200 to 300 employees,
including system operators. After accomplishing the daiichji on-line, the banks
and securities companies changed their systems departments to subsidiaries to
allow them to obtain work from the outside. As the Japanese Antimonopoly Law
prohibits banks from receiving work from other companies, banks' spinning off
their information system departments as independent entities was inevitable to
pursue such outside business.
From the latter half of the 1980s until the early 1990s, when people were
afraid to predict a 'software crisis' (a serious shortage of software engineers and
software supply), hardware manufacturers and CSK, a large software company,
established many local software companies, partly due to a cheaper labor force
and partly because a number of software engineers wanted to work close to their
hometowns to avoid poor housing conditions and other problems associated with
large cities. While several software companies, sometimes as many as fifty to
seventy, usually exist within one keiretsu group, from this author's experience,
they do not work jointly.10
B. EXAMINATION OF MERGES' KEIRETSU HYPOTHESES AND THE
CHANGING KEIRETSU STRUCTURE
Some of Professor Merges' assumptions (such as trade partners and contractual
practice) differ from the software industry practice in Japan and tend to overesti-
mate the effect of keiretsu. In this author's experience as in-house counsel for
a keiretsu software company-one of the largest and oldest software companies
in Japan-and from interviews conducted with industry executives and trade
association personnel, Professor Merges' assumptions should be revisited. In the
course of examining Merges' hypotheses, the reality of keiretsu transactions in
the software industry setting is also introduced here.
Professor Merges' hypothesis is based on the following perception of keiretsu
software companies, formulated, in part, by relying on some presentations at
the International Computer Software Industry Project at Berkeley in 1992:
[M]ost software companies in Japan are affiliated at least informally with large Japanese
companies or groups of companies-the famous keiretsu structure. Reports in the early
1990s show that in Japan, the majority of software is developed in-house or is commis-
sioned from independent (but affiliated) companies. Experts on the industry state that
even today, each software firm normally supplies only one company."'
10. See also Telephone Interviews with Akira Uchinuno (May 1995).
11. Merges, SOFTWARE INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 281.
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While fairly large Japanese software companies in the custom service segment
are keiretsu software companies, many smaller software companies are not. 12
Also, in the prepackaged software segment, most companies do not belong to
keiretsu. 3 In number, mid-sized or small-sized software companies constitute
the majority of the 7,000 software companies in Japan. 14
More importantly, keiretsu software companies are not limited to a single trade
partner.' 5 In rare cases, a few software companies that are a part of a hardware
manufacturer keiretsu and that deal with operating systems might supply only
one company. ' 6 Trade partners of most keiretsu software companies, however,
include several, even dozens of companies both inside and outside of the keiretsu
group. ' 7 In sum, Merges' assumptions overestimate the effect of keiretsu.
1. Merges' Keiretsu Hypotheses (i): A Keiretsu Software Company is
Locked in its Keiretsu
Professor Merges states that a keiretsu software company is locked in each
keiretsu group because if a software company should attempt to leave its keiretsu,
not only would it lose work from the other companies within the same keiretsu
group, but it would also not be able to obtain financing easily.' 8 This theory is
generally correct although, as discussed above, a keiretsu software company does
have trade partners both inside and outside of the keiretsu group, 9 and this trade
partner diversification will continue as Japanese companies strengthen their focus
on cost performance. Also, a primary advantage for a keiretsu software company
is the ease of obtaining financing.
a. Changing Keiretsu Structure's Influence in the Software Business Context
Due to the necessity of restructuring and/or to enable a company to report
profits during the current severe recession, the Japanese keiretsu structure is in
the midst of change. Not only are keiretsu companies selling their cross-held
12. Yukio Ohno, General Manager of the Legal Affairs Department of The Japan Research
Institute, Ltd., guesses that there are approximately 500 keiretsu software companies. Though guess-
ing, Ohno believes that the majority of software companies in number are not keiretsu software
companies. Interview with Yukio Ohno (June 2, 1994); see also JISA Membership Directory.
13. Judging from their company names and major shareholders, most members of JPSA (a trade
association of PC software companies) do not appear to be keiretsu companies. See JPSA Membership
Directory, 1995.
14. MITI Survey (1992). More than half of the 17,000 companies maintain a small office of
less than thirty employees. The top 100 companies generate thirty-six percent of the industry's sales
revenues. The White Paper 1994, supra note 1, at 71.
15. Telephone Interviews with Akira Uchinuno, Legal Department Manager of Hitachi Informa-
tion Systems (Mar. 1, 1996) & Akira Tanaka, former Chief Engineer of NEC (Mar. 10, 1996).
16. Telephone Interviews with Akira Tanaka, supra note 15 & K. Shiotsuki, Fujitsu Public
Relations, N.Y. (Mar. 5, 1996).
17. Telephone Interviews with Akira Uchinuno, supra note 15 & Akira Tanaka, supra note 15.
18. Interview with Robert P. Merges, supra note 8.
19. See supra introduction to Part B.
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shares,20 but corporations have been paying more attention to cost performance,
which inevitably results in less emphasis on the keiretsu relationship. l
Selling cross-held shares is aimed at bringing in large amounts of capital,
because equity investment in a Japanese company commands a substantially
greater asset position than the stock price may suggest. This fact is due to hidden
assets, primarily consisting of equity investments for cross-held shares and land.
They are both carried on the balance sheet at their purchase prices, even after
their market values have appreciated many times over.22 The trend of selling
cross-held shares will continue, because Japanese accounting practice will begin
to apply a market price method to financial products for the settlement of accounts
in fiscal year 2000, and to cross-held shares in fiscal year 2001, thus eliminating
the magic of "hidden assets.' 23 Also, now that the Japanese economy's high
growth period is over, the basic assumption that the trade volume will increase
in the long-term has been shaken, and high costs in the name of keiretsu have
become an arduous burden.24
b. More Competition Regardless of Keiretsu
It is basically true that keiretsu software companies receive large amounts of
work from companies within the same keiretsu group. Other than at the time of
incorporation, however, a keiretsu structure has not always brought sufficient busi-
ness to a keiretsu software company. For example, Canon Software generates sixty
percent of its sales revenue from software development-half of which is develop-
ment for companies outside the keiretsu group.25 The loosening keiretsu, with more
emphasis on cost performance, has helped bring a more competitive business envi-
ronment to the software industry, both inside and outside the keiretsu.
26
20. Even cross-shareholdings with banks are also declining while banks decrease their equity
positions in customer companies to obtain financing to write off bad debts. NIKKEI, July 30, 1995.
21. For example, the Japan Auto Manufacturers Association's announcement of setting its indus-
try standard for EDI (electronic data interchange), necessary to increase efficiency, within 1995
showed an increase of inter-keiretsu transactions. NIKKEI, Apr. 21, 1995, at 11.
22. For example, 1986 land price data showed that land owned by First Section Companies in
the Tokyo Stock Exchange was 25.2 times as valuable as its book value. KESTER, supra note 9, at
160. Also, now that stock prices and land prices have dropped, the merit of cross-holding (hidden
assets) has decreased. In addition, crossly-held shares with low dividends block effective use of
assets. NIKKEI, Aug. 17, 1995, at 4.
23. NIKKEI Bus., Jan. 11, 1999, at 26.
24. NIKKEI, Aug. 17, 1995, at 4.
25. NIKKEI, May 8, 1994.
26. In addition to the loosening keiretsu ties, the ever-increasing use of prepackaged software
under hardware downsizing (especially for their core business systems) will increase competition,
regardless of keiretsu ties. When user companies can afford customized software, they prefer a
keiretsu software house because they do not want to disclose their business scheme to member
companies of competitor groups for the purpose of software development. When information systems
integrate more prepackaged software, evaluation of the cost performance and quality of offered plans
and services may play a more significant role in user companies' decision-making than whether a
software company is within the same keiretsu or not. See Mashima, Japanese Software Companies,
supra note 7, at 433.
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There are two instances when a non-keiretsu company can cut into keiretsu
for work or when a keiretsu company can obtain work from another keiretsu:
(1) when new technological expertise is not offered within a keiretsu group; and
(2) where the work is offered based on competitive prices and quality of work.
Interviews with industry managers confirm this point." For example, Mr. Akira
Uchinuno of Hitachi Information Systems explains:
If prices and quality of work are competitive, a non-keiretsu [including a company
belonging to a different keiretsu] can get work within the keiretsu group. Before, a
non-keiretsu company could get work only when such service was not available within
the keiretsu group. But things are changing partly because of the recession and partly
because of pressure from abroad.28
Thus, trade partners of a keiretsu software company have diversified to include
relationships with companies outside of the keiretsu group. Indeed, in 1995, out
of forty-three keiretsu software companies with sales revenues of more than five
billion yen, twelve companies earned more than sixty percent of their revenues,
and another fourteen companies earned thirty to sixty percent of their revenues
from companies other than their parent companies .29 The Nikkei Computer Maga-
zine describes these companies as "independent" and "close to independent,"
respectively.
c. Keiretsu Software Companies Will Still Remain Within the Keiretsu Due
to Creditworthiness as Keiretsu Companies
Keiretsu software companies will remain within the keiretsu structure due
to creditworthiness based on their keiretsu status. Two well-known legal execu-
tives in the software industry confirm that obtaining financing is eased due
to keiretsu company status and the socially-implicit contract that a keiretsu's
parent company will not allow its subsidiary to go bankrupt. 30 At the same
time, monitoring by a main bank that is backed by its lending power continues,
suppressing the opportunistic behaviors of keiretsu software companies. This
bank monitoring partially contributes to the creditworthiness of keiretsu soft-
ware companies.
A main bank's strong influence over client corporations is based upon its
lending power as the largest provider of capital to the keiretsu group. However,
companies that could obtain funds at a lower cost in the Euromarket used such
funds to repay bank loans and became less dependent on banks. Since the 1980s,
the main bank's monitoring function within the keiretsu has further decreased
27. Interview with Mr. X (Mar. 1995) (Mr. X is an experienced business and marketing executive
for a fairly large software company in Japan. He shared his views with the author on the condition
that he remain anonymous.).
28. Interview with Akira Uchinuno (Aug. 1994).
29. NIKKEI, Mar. 30, 1998, at 150-51.
30. Telephone Interviews with Akira Uchinuno, supra note 10 &Yukio Ohno (Aug. 13, 1995).
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as a consequence of both the deregulation of the Tokyo financial market31 and
the stronger cash earnings of Japanese companies from high growth.32
However, the chain reaction of financial market deregulation and lower depen-
dence on bank lending did not affect software companies as most of them were
not listed in the capital market. The Wall Street Journal comments, "Until now,
only relatively large companies with years of profits behind them have had access
to equity financing. That system has left many of Japan's fastest-growing compa-
nies starving for cash.", 33 Thus, obtaining financing has generally remained a
concern for Japanese software companies.
Even though the keiretsu ties have been loosening, a software company's alter-
ation from a keiretsu company to a non-keiretsu company is unheard of. This is
due to the fact that keiretsu affiliation allows these companies to obtain financing
far more easily than non-keiretsu software firms. This is a great advantage in
Japan where software companies have difficulty obtaining financing because bank
lending focuses on real property as collateral, which most software companies
do not have. Also, Japanese venture capitalists, unlike those in the United States,
do not actively invest in the high-technology industry, and a functioning
NASDAQ-type market does not exist.
d. Poorly Developed Venture Capital in Japan
In Japan, investment by venture capitalists in high-technology lags far behind
its U.S. counterpart-including early-stage investment and advisory capability
for management. Nevertheless, the total amount of investment has come close
to that in the United States. 34 This is due to the weakness of Japanese venture
capitalists. 35 In contrast, U.S. venture capital invests twenty-seven percent of
their funds in the software industry.36 A 1993 source states that the U.S. figure
31. In 1980, the Amendment of the Foreign Exchange Control Law permitted cross-border capital
transactions with only prior notification of the Ministry of Finance. Obtaining a formal permit became
unnecessary. KESTER, supra note 9, at 188-89.
32. Id. at 13-14, 187-97; "The conclusion is that dependence on a bank is no more to the liking
of Japanese management than management in other countries, and for leading Japanese companies
no longer a significant issue." JAMES C. ABBEGLEN, & GEORGE STARK, JR., KAISHA: THE JAPANESE
CORPORATION 189 (1985).
33. Robert Steiner, Japan Launches Small-firm Stock Market, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1995, at
A5.
34. See Mashima, Japanese Software Companies, supra note 7, at 452-53.
35. NIKKEI, Apr. 17, 1995, at 16.
36. ld; see also Yasunori Baba et al., The Japanese Software Industry: The "Hub Structure
Approach, 24 Research Pol'y 474, 478 (1995):
The second problem is that compared with the U.S., venture capital scarcely flows
into the Japanese software industry. According to a survey in 1989, 11.0% of American
venture capital flows into the Japanese software industry, but the ratio in Japan was
only 0.04% (Nikkei, Nov. 24, 1992). The reason seems to be that venture capital
holders in Japan are not always well-versed in technological assessment and often
have difficulties calculating the returns to an investment in an expertise-intensive
company like a software house. Therefore, in contrast to the U.S., Japan is still not
in a position to promote innovative software businesses.
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is twenty-one percent which is still a high figure, even compared to other U.S.
high-technology investment in areas such as biotechnology (nine percent) and
computer hardware and systems (three percent)." Because a software company's
profits increase in J-shape (high-return) fashion thanks to minimal production
costs once a program is developed, a venture capitalist can afford to take a
high risk.38 Being able to take this high risk requires the capability to assess
technology-a job at which Japanese venture capitalists are poor.
Also, Japanese venture capitalists do not actively invest in early-stage compa-
nies because it takes an average of thirty years for a Japanese venture company
to go public. 39 This prohibits venture capitalists from collecting and cashing-in
on their investments in companies at earlier stages. 4° As a result, the ratio of
such investment is about half of that in the United States, where it takes six years
on average to go public.4' Major Japanese venture capitalists invest sixty percent
of their funds in companies that have aged more than ten years since their incorpo-
ration date, and only fifteen percent in companies aged less than five years. 42 In
general, start-up companies in Japan face difficulty in obtaining financing.43
The above thirty-year "to go public" period stems from the fact that the actual
threshold to be listed on the over-the-counter market is much higher than its
written rule," due to the special rules of the Securities Companies Association. 45
While the rule requires recurring profits of twenty million yen and net assets of
200 million yen, the actual threshold is said to be recurring profits of 300 million
yen (about $3,000,000 at a $1 = 100 yen exchange rate) and net assets of one
billion yen.46 In contrast, on the NASDAQ, the required profit is more than
$750,000 before taxes (but this is not required if net assets exceed twelve mil-
lion).47 Even companies still in the red can be listed on NASDAQ.45 Very recently,
a second over-the-counter market with lower requirements was created, but it
37. United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Venture Econom-
ics Investor Services (1993), Table No. 854, Venture Capital Disbursements by Stage and Industry
at 550 [hereinafter Bureau of the Census].
38. Hisashi Washiyama, General Manager of JAFCO America N.Y., NIKKEI SHINBUN, Feb.
15, 1996, at 26.
39. NIKKEI, Apr. 17, 1995, at 16.
40. Id.
41. Bureau of the Census, supra note 37. American venture capital investment in early stage
companies is 24% (start-up 7%, seed 7%, and other early-stage 10%). The other investment purposes
are expansion (55%), LBO (6%), and bridge loan or public purchases (15%).
42. 21-Seikiheno Venture Business, NIKKEI, Apr. 17, 1995, at 16 (according to a survey by
VEC in 1991 and 1992).
43. Out of average start-up costs of approximately twenty million yen ($200,000) in 1995, only
fifteen million yen represented loans from financial institutions while the rest was from relatives,
friends, and business partners' support. NIKKEI, Apr. 16, 1994, at 1.
44. NIKKEI, Jan. 4, 1995, at 15.
45. NIKKEI, Feb. 1, 1995.
46. NIKKEI, Jan. 4, 1995, at 15.
47. Magarikado-no Tentokabu Shijoh, NIKKEI, Aug. 23, 1994.
48. Id.
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has not been active. In the United States, "angels" and/or venture capitalists
invest in venture businesses, and successful businesses typically go public on
NASDAQ in three to five years, thus attracting new investment.49 Such fast
investment cycles do not exist in Japan.50
Still, if MITI-organized, industry-cooperative development projects had
worked, it would have been helpful to the technological development of the
cash-starved prepackaged software companies if R&D results were shared. But,
unlike its support of the computer hardware industry, MITI-initiated software
projects have mostly failed. 5' The failure of the MITI-initiated projects appears
to be due to the fact that the speed of technological development in the software
field has been much faster than the bureaucrats' planning ability. Even when
some of their projects were aimed at developing "tools commonly available for
software development," the tools actually meant aids for the dominant custom
software. Due to the nature of custom-made software, those tools (even when
produced) were not widely applicable. 52 Furthermore, the fact that using partici-
pating companies' huge R&D facilities interchangeably was not necessary in the
software field, unlike in the hardware industry, decreased the software companies'
incentives to commit themselves to industry-wide projects.
To summarize the considerations applied in the first part of Merges' hypothesis,
Japanese companies, regardless of keiretsu ties, are paying more attention to
current profits and cost performance, and thus software companies are more
competitive both inside and outside of their keiretsu. Still, keiretsu software
companies will remain within keiretsu groups because they can obtain financing
far more easily than can non-keiretsu software firms, thanks to their creditworthi-
ness. In using Merges' terminology, lower financing costs (creditworthiness)
primarily explains why a keiretsu software company is locked to its keiretsu.
2. Merges' Keiretsu Hypotheses (ii): Implicit Contracts in the Dominant
Custom Segment Caused Weak IP Protection in Japan
Professor Merges also states that implicit contracts in the dominant custom
segment caused weak IP protection in Japan:
49. Id.
50. Id.
5 1. Interview with Mr. X, supra note 27; Karl Ruping, Institute of Intellectual Property, Patent
Protection of Computer Software in Japan and the United States (Mar. 1998) at 10. For example,
"MITI supported the formation of the Information Processing Promotion Association (IPA) in 1970
[sic.] [but it] was relatively under-funded and failed to attract the support of government or industry
banks. In 1973, MITI instituted the Software Module Project which, despite generous subsidies,
never produced the family of software applications that were expected." Id. n.20. In 1975, MITI
initiated the Program Seisan Gijutsu Keikaku (Program Production Technology Plan) with a budget
of five billion yen for five years to develop common tools applicable to various programming lan-
guages. Also, MITI started the SIGMA (Software Industrialized Generator and Maintenance Aids)
Project, aiming at the automation and mechanization of software development. The planned budget
was 25 billion yen. Both projects produced little. Id.
52. Id.
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[T]he custom services segment of the Japanese industry dwarfs the prepackaged software
segment; they are 85 percent and 15 percent, respectively, of the industry .... Because
many Japanese software firms are closely allied with a particular customer/patron
[that is, keiretsu], they do not depend on formal legal rights to protect their software.
Protection of intellectual property is handled by the (largely implicit) contract between
the firms. [W]ithout an arm's-length market transaction, and the attendant risks of
misappropriation of intellectual property, there is less need for formal legal rights.
This suggests . . . .[t]he dominance of the customized software sector made strong
legal protection irrelevant. Moreover, because such protection would have restricted
access by Japanese firms to the products of foreign nationals, it would have conflicted
with the "technology transfer" policy fostered by the Japanese government. Weak
protection allowed Japanese firms to profit from foreign ideas at lower cost. The implicit
contractualprotection ofintellectualproperty was an effective appropriation mechanism
for the Japanese software firm.53
* * * [T]here appear[s] to be a connection between weak copyright protection in
Japan and the delayed emergence of the prepackaged segment of the Japanese software
industry.'4
a. No Implicit Contracts
The author disagrees. Even between keiretsu companies, written contracts
must be executed-the companies do not depend upon implicit contracts. As Mr.
Yukio Ohno, former General Manager of the Legal Affairs Department of the
Japan Research Institute, notes, "Until the early 1980s, software companies did
not make written contracts when dealing with keiretsu companies in many cases.
However, in the 1980s, software companies (including mid-size and small ones)
started to execute written contracts even when dealing with keiretsu companies."
55
Implicit contracts are not the case even with the most closely-tied hierarchical
keiretsu-such as the automobile industry.56 An experienced employee of a major
automobile manufacturer states, "Purchasing or selling goods or services without
any documentation even with keiretsu parts companies is unthinkable. If done,
our accounting department will be in trouble to deal with taxes." 57
Instead of a company's mere status as part of the keiretsu, what matters in
reducing bargaining costs seems to be: (1) experiences and length of transactions
in the past; and (2) bargaining power. Five experienced businessmen from large-
sized software companies and one from a mid-sized software company mentioned
that whether a customer is within a keiretsu group does not matter to a great
extent in contractual negotiations. In the case of a completely new customer,
contractual negotiations tend to become lengthy and more detailed. After continu-
53. Merges, SOFrWARE INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 281-82.
54. Id. at 281.
55. Interview with Mr. X, supra note 27.
56. Telephone interview with an experienced employee of one of the major auto manufacturers
in Japan (Feb. 28, 1996). A basic contract is executed and daily delivery and acceptance of parts
are based on purchase orders and statements of delivery.
57. Id. Mr. Akira Tanaka, former Chief Engineer of NEC states, "NEC executes a written
contract even with a 100% subsidiary, let alone with the other companies. This was the case in the
1980s as well." Telephone Interview with Akira Tanaka, supra note 15.
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ous transactions without trouble, the time and energy expended on contractual
negotiation decreases. 58 Thus, bargaining costs decrease over time.
Also, the bargaining power of a company affects the transaction costs. For
example, Mr. X's mid-size non-keiretsu company can use its contract form even
with much larger corporations in offering its competitive and popular system
integration service. 59 Mr. Ohno, whose company is the second-largest VAN
company (exceeded only by NTT Data) stated, "The company does not change
contracts depending upon whether a customer is a keiretsu company or not."60
b. Legislative IP Protection Still Counts
Next, returning to the relationship between implicit contracts and legislative
IP protection, even when explicit contracts are executed, legislative protection
is necessary because Japanese-style contracts generally are much simpler than
those in the United States. If the terms and conditions of contracts-especially
for continuous relationships such as custom software development and its up-
grades-are too detailed, trade partners may be offended and feel that the other
party distrusts them. Typically, contracts provide that all disputes are to be re-
solved through "mutually-amicable negotiations." Therefore, legislative protec-
tion of IP rights is still important because parties refer to statutes when their
contracts are silent or not explicit in a given matter. Further, the lack of interpre-
tive case law in Japan, due to far less litigation than in the United States, increases
the relative importance of the statutes themselves.
Indeed in the mid-1980s, JISA, a trade association of custom software compa-
nies that, unlike prepackaged software companies, depends heavily upon individ-
ual contractual negotiations with users, supported MITI's legislative draft to
protect software. 6 Thus, the dominant custom service segment was interested
in formal legal protection, even while it was negotiating and executing written
contracts. It is true that IP rights are especially important to the prepackaged
software business-they matter less in a custom software business, which depends
more upon contractual negotiations. 62 The difference is a matter of degree.
To summarize Part I, the current changing keiretsu structure (more profit-
oriented) is diversifying the trade partners of keiretsu software companies reach-
ing outside of the keiretsu groups and exposing them to more competition either
inside or outside the keiretsu. Still, keiretsu software companies will remain
within keiretsu groups due to the ease of obtaining financing thanks to their
creditworthiness as keiretsu companies, while other software companies suffer
from a poorly-developed venture capital market. Second, it is not accurate that
implicit contracts in the dominant custom segment caused weak IP protection in
58. Interview with Mr. X (Aug. 1994), supra note 27.
59. Id.
60. Interview with Yukio Ohno (May 1994).
61. See infra Part III.A.1.
62. See id.
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Japan. Keiretsu software companies, mostly in the dominant custom segment,
have not depended upon implicit contracts since the 1980s; thus, keiretsu ties
have not automatically lowered bargaining costs. Even when explicit contracts are
executed, legislation has real significance given the relatively simple contractual
practice in Japan and the lack of case law. Indeed, a trade association of custom
software companies sought legislation to protect software in the mid-1980s, and
Japanese laws have provided a relatively sufficient statutory basis for legal protec-
tion of software since the 1980s.
II. Relationship Between the Japanese Software Industry Structure and
the IP Rights Regime
This part analyzes the relationship between IP rights protection in Japan and the
Japanese software industry structure. Professor Merges notes the interrelationship
between weak IP protection in Japan and the small prepackaged software segment
of the Japanese software industry expressing that:63 (1) not only does formal IP
protection make prepackaged software business feasible, but also (2) strong IP
rights attract investment capital to firms.64 However, Merges notes as a third propo-
sition that implicit contracts, in keiretsu, in the dominant custom segment caused
weak IP protection in Japan. 65 Thus, he states that weak legislative IP protection
has caused the underdeveloped prepackaged software segment in Japan.
While the author agrees with part one of Merges' theory, she disagrees with
the remaining two parts, because some of Merges' assumptions differ from the
industry practices in Japan. In this section, the effect of software protection by
the Japanese legislation is examined from the standpoint of bargaining 66 and
monitoring costs. Then, the impact of IP rights protection on financing is analyzed
in the Japanese context.
A. REDUCTION OF BARGAINING COSTS AND FEASIBILITY OF PREPACKAGED
SOFTWARE BUSINESS UNDER IP LEGISLATION
Concerning the relationship between IP rights, bargaining costs, and the indus-
try structure,67 Professor Merges states that legislative IP rights protection for
63. Merges, SOFTWARE INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 290.
64. Id. at 283, 287.
65. Id. at 281-82.
66. Id. at 282-83. Though Professor Merges uses the phrase "transaction costs," he appears
to mean bargaining costs, considering the context. In general, "transaction costs" include bargaining
costs, monitoring costs, and information costs. The information costs are, among others, expenses
necessary to determine the size of the potential markets or value of the technology to a licensee.
ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY-CASES AND MATERIALS 773-75 (1992) [hereinafter
MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY].
67. Merges, SoFrWARE INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 282-83. Professor Merges' theory differs
from a simple "incentive theory." Strong IP protection heightens the return to investment, increasing
investment and entry into the production of software; weaker IP protection has the opposite effect.
Id. at 281-82.
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software replaces expensive individual contractual negotiation, thus making pre-
packaged software business feasible. Merges writes:
[Property rights] reduce transaction costs; or, more accurately, they make certain trans-
actions feasible that otherwise would not be. This view of intellectual property rights,
which might be termed the "off-the-rack-contract" view, is especially important for
prepackaged software. Product attributes in this segment are general rather than specific
to a particular end user. Similarly, intellectual property rights can be viewed as statutory
terms of exchange that provide general transaction attributes .. . These rights matter
less in the custom software segment, where both product and transactional attributes
are customized to meet the needs of the individual end user. The legal framework that
governs exchanges in this market segment, primarily contract law and its closely related
cousin, trade secrets, reflects this fact.
[Clopyright law provides an 'off-the-rack' contract between buyers and sellers
of intellectual property, taking the place of individually negotiated contracts.68
The author agrees with this part of Merges' theory on the following three grounds.
First, the Interim Report of the Copyright Council in 1984, which founded the
1985 Amendment to the Japanese Copyright Law (JCL) to extend copyright
protection to software, expressed that the increase of prepackaged software should
require legislative protection of computer software. The report stated:
In consideration of the following changes in the environment, more concrete consider-
ation of the legal protection of software is required. . . . Prepackaged software has
increased its shipped amount. With respect to software for personal computers, most
of the software . . . is prepackaged. Prepackaged software for personal computers is
distributed through various channels such as bookstores, department stores and software
retail stores. 69
Here, the Copyright Council recognized the interrelationship between the
growing shipment of prepackaged software and the need to protect software
under the Copyright Law. This Report formed the basis for the 1985 Amend-
ment to the JCL. As shown by the chart below, the prepackaged software
segment in Japan has steadily increased its sales revenues since 1985, although
the increase is partly attributable to the constant increase of personal computer
(PC) shipments.7 °
Sales Revenues of Prepackaged Software for Personal Computers in Japan
71
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Growth rate from the N/A 39 27 41 45 32 19 9 14
previous year (%)
68. Id. at 282-83.
69. The Interim Report of the Copyright Council (1984).
70. JECC COMPUTER NOTE 22 (JEIDA 1993); JEIDA Report.
71. DENTSU SOHKEN, JYOHO MEDIA HAKUSHO 107 (1995) (based on data from JPSA).
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Second, Mr. Tamotsu Satoh, senior executive managing director of Intercom,
believes that prepackaged software vendors can rely on legislative protection
instead of contractual negotiations:
The company will fight under the Copyright Law concerning what its shrink-wrap license
does not mention. The company sells its prepackaged software through distributors, so
it is convenient for the company to adopt the shrink-wrap license. Some users, however,
even neglect the provisions of its shrink-wrap license because the validity of a shrink-
wrap license has not been established because case law does not exist. Therefore, when
such a user infringes Intercom's copyright, the company will directly sue the user under
the Copyright Law."
Finally, the fact that an association of prepackaged software companies (JPSA)
sought strong enforcement of the Copyright Law and an association of custom
software companies (JISA) has worked on its model contract,73 supports Merges'
theory.
The JPSA, founded in 1982, has been working hard to eliminate illegal copies-
a critical problem for prepackaged software companies. Prepackaged software
companies incur debts at the beginning to develop their products and can recover
their investments and reinvest their earnings in subsequent development by selling
the products. But, copying software is easy, costs little, and can be repeated
without causing deterioration to the original program. Unlike the case of custom-
made business software, it is difficult to contractually negotiate and monitor each
user; a shrink-wrap license is used for convenience. To cope with this problem,
the JPSA established its watch-dog department for software protection in 1985.
JPSA has also held seminars to educate users and put 18,000 anti-illegal copying
posters in prepackaged software shops, corporations, computer schools, and other
locations. 74 Thus, the JPSA's effort has been focused on the strong enforcement
of the Copyright Law.
In contrast, the JISA tried to protect its members' rights through contractual
negotiations. For more than a decade, the JISA has been studying its own model
contract for software development in order to help its members' contractual
negotiations with users. 75 The JISA published its Model Contract for Custo-
mized System Development in 1986 and partially revised it in 1993 and 1995.76
Noticing this, the MITI organized the Common Frame Committee 77 to provide
common contract terms, development procedure (e.g. system planning and
72. Interview with Tamotshu Satoh, Senior Executive Managing Director of Intercom (Mar.
1995). Intercom has developed and sold the best selling communication software.
73. Interviews with Akira Ogata, JISA Manager (Mar. 1995).
74. Yoxo Shimizu, Packaged Software Kaihatsu-no Chosakuken Mondai-towa, KENKYU KA-
HATSU MGMT., Dec. 1993, at 71.
75. Interview with Akira Ogata, supra note 73.
76. JISA, Model Contract of System Software Development Comments, Dec. 1994, preface.
77. Interview with Akira Ogata, supra note 73.
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installation), and price estimation for custom software development (the Com-
mon Frame).78 Users are gradually accepting it.79
In sum, the Japanese Copyright Council's recognition of the necessity of copy-
right law protection for prepackaged software, Mr. Satoh's statement, JPSA's
(prepackaged segment) focus on the enforcement of the Copyright Law, and
JISA's (custom segment) contractual approach, all show that legislative IP rights
protection makes the prepackaged software business feasible as an off-the-rack-
contract and is especially important for prepackaged software.
B. No EFFECT ON MONITORING COSTS
Next, the problem of monitoring costs cannot be solved by simply strengthening
IP rights unless a compulsory investigation right is included. 80 It is well-known
that enforcing a technology license is difficult. First, with respect to copyright,
making an illegal copy of a computer program is easy and costs little. Moreover,
copying can be repeated without causing deterioration to the original program.
Also, with respect to patents, a licensor is mainly concerned that: (1) a licensee
may incorporate the patent technology into more products or sell more units than
he reports; and (2) the licensee is only entering into the deal to acquire the
technology, that is, after selling a few units, he may terminate the agreement
and introduce a product incorporating similar, but non-infringing technology. 8
Though a compulsory investigation right does not currently exist even under
the U.S. Copyright Act or the Patent Act, broad discovery in the U.S. litigation
system helps investigation and monitoring. Japanese software companies in the
prepackaged software business are especially concerned about illegal copying. 2
According to a 1994 report issued by the Software Publishers Association, the
rate of illegal copying stands at fifty-six percent. 83 Japanese prepackaged software
companies have tried to tackle this problem through user education and criminal
accusation.'
C. LITTLE EFFECT OF IP RIGHTS ON FINANCING IN JAPAN
Professor Merges comments that legislative protection of software helps soft-
ware companies obtain financing because: (1) legislative protection reduces trans-
78. JISA, supra note 76, at 123.
79. Interview with Akira Ogata, supra note 73. Partly to integrate the Common Frame to its
model contract and partly to follow new hardware environment (downsizing, open systems, etc.),
JISA further updated its model contract in December 1995. JISA, supra note 76, preface.
80. A compulsory investigation right authorizes a licensor to investigate business places and
books of a licensee.
81. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY, supra note 66, at 774.
82. See Mashima, Japanese Software Companies, supra note 7, at 445.
83. SPA News Release, Feb. 24, 1995. The piracy rate in the United States was twenty-five
percent.
84. See Interview with Fuminobu Satoh, JPSA (Mar. 13, 1995).
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action costs (bargaining costs), and thus the required amount of funding can be
smaller; and (2) when a copyright law protects software, and software companies
own the copyright of software, investors can take the copyright of companies'
software (e.g., in case of default to sell or lease to another company to continue
the development of the software).85 In Japan, however, the strengthening IP
protection did not contribute to the latter because financing systems for venture
businesses differ from those in the United States for the three reasons discussed
above.86
1. Strong Financial Backing is Crucial, Especially for
Prepackaged Software Business
In the prepackaged software business, companies must bear both development
costs and the risk that the market may not accept the new product. In contrast,
in the custom software business, it is virtually guaranteed that the developed
software will be received by the customer. Software companies bear only opera-
tion costs until the last payment by a customer.
Unlike the custom business, the prepackaged software business requires not
only up front investment, but also a higher ratio of R&D costs to sales revenues
to support innovation.87 Strong financial backing is therefore crucial to enter and
be successful in the prepackaged software business.8 Further, investment in the
prepackaged software business is becoming more costly. The Nikkei Computer
Magazine estimates an average development cost for the first version of a new
prepackaged program to be 100 million yen ($1 million under the exchange rate
of $1 = 100 yen), regardless of the applicable hardware type. This figure is based
on an average term of development of two years with less than ten software
engineers. 9 Mr. Yoshinobu Watanabe, Director of Dynaware, says that currently
if a software title does not support at least sales of 100 million yen, software
houses will be in red ink.90 In addition, a software executive states:
Recent competition has raised marketing costs up to 50 million through 100 million
yen. In addition, a company needs to keep the same ten engineers for upgrades, which
costs another 100 million yen. Therefore, a software house cannot earn profits if the
sales revenues of a new program are less than 300 million yen (3 million dollars). 9'
85. See Merges, SOFTWARE INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 287 (discussion with Professor
Merges (July 20, 1995); "[S]trong intellectual property rights attract investment capital to small
firms...").
86. See supra Part I.B.1(2)(ii). First, bank lending practices focus on real estate collateral.
Second and most importantly, venture capitalists are not high-technology oriented and are poor at
evaluating the value of software. Third, a NASDAQ-type capital market does not exist.
87. NIKKEI, Nov. 1, 1993, at 136.
88. See Mashima, Japanese Software Companies, supra note 7, at 452.
89. NIKKEI, Feb. 7, 1994, at 62.
90. Interview with Yoshinobu Watanabe, Director of Dynaware (Mar. 17, 1995).
91. Interview with Mr. X (Mar. 16, 1995), supra note 27.
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2. Practical Problems of Software as Collateral-Bank Lending Focused on
Real Property as Collateral
The Japanese Copyright Law assumes that a pledge can be established on copy-
rights and notes its effect. 92 The Japanese case law also permits the establishment
of the right of mortgage on copyrights. Nevertheless, in Japan, IP rights are rarely
used to obtain financing. In Japan, almost forty percent of industrial finance is
supplied by bank lending, which traditionally requires real property as collateral. 93
But most software companies do not own real property. On average, only seventy
cases involving the use of patents and trademarks as collateral occur each year.9'
Most are used as trade credits, while only a few are used for lending by financial
institutions.95 Using software as collateral is much less frequent.96 Since the 1986
inception of the program registration system, the registration instances to establish
the right of pledge and mortgage has remained at less than twenty.97
Mr. Tashiro, formally of the Japan Development Bank, points out three prob-
lems affecting the effectiveness of software as collateral: (1) vagueness of content;
(2) risk; and (3) difficulty in evaluating the value of software as collateral.98
Vagueness of content refers to updates, the complicated relationship of IP rights of
derivative works (customization of prepackaged programs and porting of foreign
programs into Japanese), and the prohibition of assignment clauses in license
contracts. Risk always accompanies financing, especially for high-tech industries
like the software industry. The Nikkei Computer Magazine has mentioned that
difficulty in evaluating the value of software as collateral, as well as an underdevel-
oped market to sell software collateral, are reasons for banks' unwillingness to
accept software as collateral. 99
Now even in the United States, banks are not active investors in the software
industry-venture capitalists (before a software company goes public) and capital
market firms (after going public) are its investors.00 U.S. banks consider software
as supplemental collateral.' 0 ' Software companies in Japan, however, continue
to suffer from poorly developed venture capital markets. Strengthened IP protec-
tion for software in Japan has not helped software companies obtain financing.
Although Japanese game software companies are not keiretsu companies that
can easily obtain financing,'°2 they have been successful and internationally com-
92. Japanese Copyright Law art. 66.
93. Yasuhisa Tashiro, Chitekizaisanken-no Tanpo-Toshiteno Katsuyo-nitsuite [ Use of Intellectual
Property Rights as Collateral], in RESEARCH OF BASIC PROBLEMS ON THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 281 (Institute of Intellectual Property ed., 1993).




98. Interview with Yasuhisa Tashiro (Jan. 1995).
99. NIKEI, May 13, 1996, at 91.
100. Tashiro, supra note 93, at 291.
101. Id. at 290.
102. See supra Part I.B.l.b.
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petitive. 103 The following conditions (such as a large market)-unique to the game
software field in the 1980s-account for their exceptional success. First, the
target population (market) for game software includes virtually the entire nation
(even though many customers of game software are not adults), and many popular
game programs sold millions of copies. In the early 1980s in Japan, PCs were
very expensive and only research institutes and a limited number of companies
owned them, decreasing the potential market for prepackaged business soft-
ware.' 0 4 In contrast, a popular Nintendo game machine cost a mere 30,000-
40,000 yen ($83-$111 U.S. under the then-current exchange rate of $1=360
yen), including game software. Playing game software was a completely new
amusement, and a popular game program could sell millions of copies. In the
1980s, many million-seller programs appeared. Even though the unit price of
game software was far cheaper than the prepackaged business software, million-
seller game programs rewarded their software developers handsomely.1 05
Second, because the product cycle of game software is much shorter than that
of business software, the huge earnings from sales of game software occurred
in a short period of time after a game's release. Therefore, a game software
company that developed a hit program could quickly recover its initial investment
and promptly reinvest its profits in hiring increasingly capable software engineers
to develop even more game programs. 10 6
Third, because the development cost of a game program was not high in those
days, entering the game software business was relatively easy, which further helped
this "pioneer era." Thus, the existence of a far larger market for game software
(relative to business software) since the early 1980s-together with a fast cycle
of investment,profits, and reinvestment in the game software field-resulted in a
'financing-blues free' environment for the game software field, enabling its excep-
tional success in the underdeveloped Japanese prepackaged software segment. 107
103. While Japan exported only 13.5 billion yen worth of software (excluding game programs
in 1994, it imported 259.5 billion yen worth of such software. However, when the game software
was included in the statistics, Japan's import and export of software were almost equal. NIKKEI,
Nov. 2, 1995, at 11.
104. Even as of 1996, "[t]he absolute size of the Japanese PC market is approximately one-fourth
of that in the U.S .... even though the Japanese population is half that of the U.S." Mashima,
Japanese Software Companies, supra note 7, at 440.
105. The existence of a sizable market is crucial for a high technology industry because a high
technology industry requires a high ratio of R&D expenses to total expenses. R&D expenses are
fixed charges; therefore, the more units of developed products that are sold, the lower the R&D
costs per unit. Thus, a large market allows a software company to spend more on R&D because
these costs can be spread over a large number of units .... In a huge market, a software company
can achieve necessary sales revenues more easily in a shorter period of time than in a small market,
even if its individual market share is small. See id. at 439.
106. [A] high technology company must earn large profits from a new product quickly, before
competitors introduce similar products, so the company can both recover its investment at an early
stage and invest in new R&D in a timely manner. Early investment is also important for a company
to enable it to generate revenue to reinvest in upgrade developments. See id.
107. The game software information is based on an interview with Mr. Kouzuki Kagemasa,
President of KONAMI, in December 1996. Mr. Kouzuki adds that nowadays, due to harsh competi-
tion, a million-seller game program in the Japanese market is almost impossible.
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To summarize Part II, legislative IP rights protection for software in Japan made
the prepackaged software business feasible by replacing expensive, individual
contractual negotiations, but it did not reduce monitoring costs. More importantly,
legislative IP rights protection for software did not help Japanese software compa-
nies to obtain financing because: (1) Japanese venture capitalists are not skilled
at evaluating the value of software; (2) Japanese venture capitalists are unwilling
to invest in early-stage companies due to the lack of a NASDAQ-type capital
market; and (3) bank lending focuses on real property. The causal link that
Professor Merges assumes exists between IP rights protection and the underdevel-
oped prepackaged segment of the Japanese software industry structure is discon-
nected here. The remainder of Professor Merges' hypothesis concerning legisla-
tive IP protection will be examined in Part III, and the fact that the software
industry did not affect the legal scheme of copyright protection is also explained.
For the author's concise analysis of the Keiretsu influence on transaction and
financing costs, please see the appendix.
I. Intellectual Property Rights Protection for Software in Japan-
Is It Weaker than Protection Provided in the United States?
This part examines whether legislative IP protection for software in Japan is as
weak as Professor Merges assumes. Until very recently, copyright has generally
played a major role in protection for software both in Japan and the United States.
Patents on software-related inventions receive the next priority in this chapter,
including Japan's new examination guidelines published in 1993 and 1997. Basi-
cally, copyright protects the literal expression of software code against copying.108
"Look and feel" seeks to protect the various nonliteral elements of a computer
program such as screen displays and the menu structure. On the other hand,
patent law protects "the general inventive concept specified in patent claims,
such as a method for performing some software function or operation."'09 Trade
secret protection is basically contract-based, and so it is not explored here other
than to point out that the Japanese Unfair Competition Prevention Act was revised
in 1991 to protect trade secrets and that the Japanese Civil Procedure Law was
partly revised in 1996 to protect trade secrets in litigation. "o
108. A description of a machine protected by copyright only prevents others from copying and
does not prevent others from writing a description of their own or from making and using the machine.
Unlike patents, independent creation can be a defense to a copyright holder.
109. Merges, SOFTWARE INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 275.
110. See Kazuko Matsuo, Recent Amendment to the Unfair Competition Prevention Law for the
Protection of Trade Secrets, 9 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 78 (1991). See FED. R. Civ. P. 92 (effective
as of Jan. 1, 1998) (stating that the court will prohibit third parties from perusing or copying the
record of proceedings upon a party's request and prima facie proof).
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A. COPYRIGHT
1. Copyright Protection for Software in Japan
In 1982, for the first time, a Japanese court affirmed the availability of copyright
protection for software,111 and other courts followed this decision. In 1985, the
Japanese Copyright Law (JCL) was amended to protect computer programs (the
1985 Amendment). During the amendment process, a legislative battle between
the MITI and the Cultural Affairs Agency (CAA) of the Ministry of Education
(MOE) developed-a sui generis approach versus a copyright approach."12 The
software industry supported the MITI's approach. The program right, as drafted
by the MITI, was a hybrid of industrial property rights (such as patents) and
copyright, but it is difficult to say whether the MITI's draft allowed for strong
IP protection. At the least, it included the following pro-technology diffusion
provisions: (a) shorter protection period (15 years from development); (2) a saitei
seido (a compulsory non-exclusive license by arbitration in certain cases); and
(3) the exclusion of moral rights. The MITI draft viewed software as an economic
property with a short product cycle under rapid technological development, creat-
ing value only when used. Moreover, the draft mentioned the necessity of stan-
dardization of basic programs for interoperability11 3 The CAA, however, won
the battle partly because of an international trend to protect software under copy-
right laws, partly because of pressure from the United States, and partly because
of a string of Japanese court decisions affirming the copyrightability of computer
software.
The 1985 Amendment added "program works" as a separate category to
examples of copyrightable works listed in article 10 of the JCL.l"4 Program is
defined as "an expression of combined instructions given to a computer so as
to make it function and obtain a certain result."" 5 The definition of "program
works" does not include design documents, flow charts, manuals, or other docu-
mentation that the JCL protects as lexical works (those involving novels, plays,
essays, or lectures) or as pictorial works.' 16
111. Taito Corp. v. I.N.G. Enters. (Tokyo Dist. Ct. Dec. 6, 1982), reported in 482 HANREI
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1983, at 70.
112. See JONATHAN BAND & MASANOBU KATOH, INTERFACE ON TRIAL 284-86 (1995); see also
YOSHIKAZu TAKAISHI ET AL., SENTANSANGYU-NO CHITEKISHOYU-UKEN 33-42 (1990).
113. NOBUHIRo NAKAYAMA, SOFrWARE-NO HOUTEKIHOGO 214-29 (1988) [hereinafter NAKAY-
AMA, SOFIWAREI.
114. Ms. Kumiko Bandou of the Ministry of Education, a senior official responsible for the 1985
Amendment, stated: "Several judicial precedents had justified programs as copyrightable works and
as deserving protection under the Copyright Law. In order to make this clear, we added program
works to the examples of copyrightable works. Kumiko Bandou, An Amendment to the Copyright
Law, NBL 20 (1985) [hereinafter Bandou, Amendment].
115. Translation by Copyright Research and Information Center, Copyright Law of Japan (Nov.
1993 ed.) [hereinafter Copyright Center Translation].
116. The lexical work is similar to the term "literary work" in section 102(a) of the U.S. Copyright
Act, but narrower. See BAND & KATOH, supra note 112, at 287.
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The 1985 Amendment also defined the limits of copyright protection for soft-
ware. Article 10(3) states:
The protection granted by this Law [to program works] shall not extend to any program-
ming language, rule or algorithm used for making such works. In this case, the following
terms shall have the meaning hereby assigned to them respectively:
(i) "programming language" means letters and other symbols as well as their systems
for use as means of expressing a program;
(ii) "rule" (kiyaku) means a special rule on how to use in a particular program a
programming language mentioned in the preceding item;
(iii) "algorithm" (kaiho) means methods of combining, in a program, instructions
given to a computer.
1 7
The term "rule" is commonly interpreted as concretely referring to interface
specifications and protocols." 8
Article 10(3) confirms a fundamental principle of an idea/expression dichotomy
expressed in article 2: the JCL protects only expressions, not underlying ideas.
Mr. Moriyuki Kado and Ms. Bandou, senior officials in charge of the 1985
Amendment, made this point clear. Mr. Kado stated:
Copyrightable works mean, as defined in Article 2(l)-1, a production in which thoughts
or sentiments "are expressed" in a creative way and which falls within the literary,
scientific, artistic or musical domain. Therefore, the languages used as a means of
expressions as well as principles, ideas, and promises underlying expressions are not
copyrightable works. Nor does the protection for copyrightable works extend to these.
This is right and proper (a logical consequence). However, regarding programs, the
scope of copyright (especially rights of adaptation) occasionally becomes an issue in
relation to an underlying idea, etc. Accordingly, article 10(3) was legislated in order
to confirm the above point. "9
This principle has been firmly established by judicial rule as well.' 20 Thus, the
JCL protects only literal expressions of software, while the Patents Law protects
general inventive concepts.
2. The Legality of Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering is a means of starting with a known product and working
backward to define the process that aided in its development or manufacture.' 2'
An essential question is whether that intermediate copy constitutes copyright
infringement. For reverse engineering, at least, a person needs to use a program
on a computer. A temporary copy of the program is made in the computer's
117. Copyright Center Translation, supra note 115.
118. MoRiYuKi KADO, CHOSAKUKENHO CHIKUJO KOUGI 98-99 (1994) [hereinafter KADO,
KoUGi]; NAKAYAMA, SOFTWARE, supra note 113, at 42; BAND & KATOH, supra note 112, at 288.
119. See KADo, KOUGI, supra note 118, at 98-99 (emphasis added); see also Bandou, Amendment,
supra note 114, at 20.
120. Dennis Karjala & Keiji Sugiyama, Fundamental Concepts in Japanese and American Copy-
right Law, 36 Am. J. COMP. L. 613, 649 (1988) [hereinafter Karjala & Sugiyama, Fundamental
Concepts].
121. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
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main memory. A memory dump may require an extra copy-a printout of the
memory's contents including the program. Further, disassembly includes addi-
tional copying, translating the object code in memory back into an approximation
of source code. 22
3. The Legality of Reverse Engineering under the Japanese Copyright Law
As far as reverse engineering to achieve interoperability is concerned, a fair
use defense may be extracted from the JCL: (1) the balancing of the authors'
rights with the benefit of the public and technology development; 2 3 and (2) an
idea/expression dichotomy. 12 4 Unlike traditional copyrightable works, software
is a functional work and is an independent and separate category of copyrightable
works under the JCL. More importantly, human beings cannot read and know
its underlying ideas without obtaining an intermediate copy. Therefore, allowing
reverse engineering necessary to achieve interoperability best serves the above
two fundamental principles in the software context, as explained below. '
25
The JCL does not contain a general fair use provision, which the U.S. courts
rely upon in analyzing a reverse engineering issue, 2 6 nor does the JCL directly
address reverse engineering. However, article 1 provides, "The purpose of this
[Copyright] Law is . . . to aim at protecting the rights of authors, etc., while
considering fair utilization of these cultural products, and thereby to contribute
to the development of culture.,
127
Furthermore, the Copyright Law protects only expressions. Underlying ideas
should be available for the public use. If authors want to protect their underlying
idea, their work must meet higher requirements for protection under the Patent
Law (such as novelty and nonobviousness). Since the new 1993 Guidelines of
the Agency of Patents clarified the availability of software patents, protection
of ideas in software should depend upon patents.
Unlike traditional copyrightable works, not only is software inherently func-
tional (as it directly causes machine processes to be performed), but people cannot
study the underlying ideas of software-usually distributed only in electronic
form-without first obtaining an intermediate copy. First, at a minimum, loading
122. See BAND & KATOH, supra note 112, at 17. (The reverse translation process of disassembly
does not reconstruct certain explanatory "comments" and the names of "variables" of the original
source code). See BriefAmicus Curiae of Eleven Copyright Law Professors in Sega Enterprises Ltd.
v. Accolade, Inc., 33 No. 1 Jurimetrics 147, 152 [hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae].
123. JCL art. 1.
124. JCL arts. 2 & 10(3).
125. Cf id. at 154. (Also, it is much easier than in the U.S. Copyright Act where "literary
works" also covers software. Under the U.S. Copyright Act, by emphasizing a functional or utilitarian
aspect of software, "thinner" copyright protection for that aspect is rationalized).
126. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). Cf. JCL (containing several provisions that permit
reproduction or exploitation of works in specific situations such as reproduction for private use).
127. JCL art. 1 (emphasis added). All translations of the JCL in this article are the author's,
unless otherwise stated.
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a program on to a computer and making a human readable copy in object code (1 s
and Os) is necessary. Yet, a typical program in object code consists of thousands,
sometimes millions, of Os and Is. It is virtually impossible to study a program
by examining only its object code. 128 More realistically, a version closer to source
code is necessary. Disassembly or decompilation is the only practical way one
can read and analyze the ideas and functions contained in a computer program.
Thus, prohibiting all reverse engineering has the practical effect of completely
denying access to the underlying ideas. This result contradicts the ideas/expres-
sion dichotomy. Total prohibition of software reverse engineering allows monop-
olization of ideas under lower requirements than the Patent Law seeks, and thus
blocks the development of technology.
On the other hand, allowing all reverse engineering may erode incentive for
developers, leading to less technological development. While encouraging inter-
operability may harm the industry giants' market share, it also may actually
increase those programs' market share by enhancing the existing software. For
example, one company's spell-checking program that is operable with a word-
processing program of another company benefits the latter program's users and
thus makes it more popular.
Developers of successful programs might license others to create interoperable
software, but this method is problematic because: (1) those who do not accept
unreasonable demands may not receive licenses; (2) time will be wasted on negoti-
ations; and (3) software prices will be higher to account for such licensing fees.
The crucial problem is the first one. For example, in the Sega v. Accolade case,
Sega insisted on a policy that all programs developed by Accolade must be manu-
factured exclusively by Sega. Accolade gave up pursuing a license from Sega
and instead turned to reverse engineering. 2 9
Therefore, considering both interests, allowing reverse engineering-when
necessary to achieve interoperability-serves the best balancing of authors' rights
with the benefit of the public and technology development. 30 This is the purpose
of the JCL. 3' By way of example, if ID code consisting of eight characters-
necessary for interoperability-is copied into a new program, the legality of the
new program will depend upon the copyrightability of the ID code. But the
eight-character ID code is probably not copyrightable due to lack of creativity.
128. Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 122, at 152-53.
129. Christian H. Nadan & James W. Morando, Standardization and Interoperability Become
Key Factor in Copyright Law, 10 No. 4 COMPUTER LAW. 12 (1993).
130. Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama of Tokyo University, one of the leading intellectual property
scholars in Japan, addresses the admissibility of reverse engineering. See NAKAYAMA, SOFTWARE,
supra note 113, at 130-31. Mr. Masanobu Katoh, general manager of the Washington, D.C. office
of Fujitsu, shares a similar view with the author. See BAND & KATOH, supra note 112, at 294-96.
131. Cf. JCL art. 30 (allowing reproduction for private use). Also with ownership of a reproduction
of a program, the owner of a reproduction of a program work may make a reproduction or adaptation
(including the reproduction of a derivative work created by the adaptation) to the extent necessary
to use the program work on a computer. See JCL art. 47-2(1).
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If the original program is copied more than is necessary for interoperability, it
likely constitutes infringement. The copyrightability of the copied part into a
newly developed program forms a key to the final judgment.
The 1985 Amendment's silence on reverse engineering did not intend to pro-
hibit reverse engineering. On this point, an anonymous source who was heavily
involved in the legislative process of the 1985 Amendment stated:
Looking into the U.S. situation, the Copyright Act itself did not contain a specific
provision addressing reverse engineering, while the Semiconductor Chip Program Act
of 1984 did. Further, at that time [in 1984 and 1985], reverse engineering was so hot
an issue that it was difficult to write [a specific article addressing reverse engineering].
On the other hand, Article 10(3) could be interpreted to give room for allowing reverse
engineering. Leaving this room, we postponed deciding how to deal with reverse engi-
neering. Actually, soon after the 1985 Amendment, a working group was formed to
discuss the issue. A conclusion, however, was not reached.1
32
Indeed, in the early 1980s, no national copyright laws anywhere in the world
dealt with software reverse engineering. 133 Competition in the software industry
hinged on resolving this issue and protecting the non-literal elements of software.
The debate in the United States focused on these issues.'M During the course of
Japanese legislation concerning software, the United States applied pressure,
affecting the victory of the CAA's copyright approach over the MITI's sui generis
approach.
Even inside the United States, opinions among the leading commentators were
divided. The legality of loading a program into memory at the beginning of
reverse engineering was not clear until 1988 when the Fifth Circuit allowed it
under the fair use doctrine in section 107.13' Disassembly, one method of reverse
engineering, involves creating a derivative work. The solution of that issue had to
wait until Sega v. Accolade, which upheld a fair use defense in reverse engineering
"where disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional
elements embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where there is a
legitimate reason for seeking such access."1 36 Moreover, the above anonymous
source stated that the legislators hoped that the 1985 JCL Amendments could be
132. Telephone Interview with Mr. Y (Nov. 24, 1995) (emphasis added) (Mr. Y is a career
bureaucrat who shared his views with the author on the condition that he remain anonymous.).
Because unlike in the United States, it is not congressmen and their staffs, but bureaucrats who work
for the cabinets sending bills to the Parliament that mostly draft bills for legislation in Japan, their
comments have more significance in Japan.
133. See BAND & KATOH, supra note 112, at xvii-xviii.
134. See id. at xviii.
135. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
136. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992). The case concerned
a Sega lock-out program. Accolade copied Sega's software to discover the functional requirements
for compatibility with Sega's console. The amount of copying was minimal (twenty bytes of initializa-
tion code and the letters of S-E-G-A), and there was no alternative. In considering the second statutory
fair use factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, the court endorsed the Computer Associates
decision. See infra note 164.
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interpreted to allow for reverse engineering. Thus, the 1985 Amendment's silence
on reverse engineering should not be construed to prohibit it.137
4. Case Law: Did the Microsoft v. Shuuwa Decision of 1987 Prohibit
Reverse Engineering?
In Microsoft Corp. v. Shuuwa System Trading KK,138 the defendant Shuuwa
dumped Microsoft's object code from memory, disassembled the object code,
and published the disassembled code in book form with Shuuwa's comments
and labels.1 3 9 Microsoft sought and obtained an injunction. This case is fre-
quently cited in considering case law on reverse engineering, but a dispute
exists as to whether it goes as far as prohibiting reverse engineering. 140 Al-
though decided under the pre-amendment JCL, its precedential value remains
because Japanese courts allowed protection of computer programs by copyright
since 1982.141
The court held that Microsoft's program, as a part of the operating system,
was protected by copyright. The court further held that converting object code
into hexadecimal form constituted reproduction of the plaintiff's object code. It
also stated that disassembling the object code and adding explanatory labels to
the disassembled and interpreted version constituted reproduction because the
work at issue and Shuuwa's work differed only by their explanatory labels.
Finally, the court rejected the defendant's fair use defense, stating that "[P]ublish-
ing the work at issue, which was not made public as a source program by its
author ... cannot be justified simply because the publication was done for the
convenience of the users. "
142
137. 1219 HANREI JIHo 48; HANREI HYAKUSEN 60-61 (1994 ed.). Some commentators justify
reverse engineering using article 47-2(1) of the JCL, which provides: [T]he owner of a reproduction
of a program work may make a reproduction or adaptation (including the reproduction of a derivative
work created by the adaptation) to the extent necessary to use the program work on a computer.
See JCL arts. 47-52(1). This article, however, applies only to the "owner of a reproduction of a
program work," not to a licensee. KADO, KouGi, supra note 118, at 254. Because most of the
industry practice uses licenses, article 47-2(1) actually covers few situations, and therefore does not
solve the issues of reverse engineering. NAKAYAMA, SOFrWARE, supra note 113, at 78 n.2, "Because
this Article is considered optional, contractual provisions govern when a contract exists."
138. (Tokyo Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 1987).
139. The plaintiff, Microsoft, developed a BASIC interpreter as part of the operating system of
NEC's PC-8001. Microsoft wrote the original program in ASSEMBLY language, converted it into
object code, and stored it in the PC-8001's read-only memory (ROM). The source code of the
program in ASSEMBLY language, which was the work at issue, was never published. The defendant,
Shuuwa, converted the object code back into hexadecimal form and then disassembled it into ASSEM-
BLY language. Shuuwa converted the numerical addresses existing in the disassembled program
into word labels for easier understanding. Then, Shuuwa published in book form the disassembled
code together with labels and comments to assist readers' comprehension.
140. Professor Nakayama stated that the Microsoft v. Shuuwa decision ruled the entire series of
acts of dumping, disassembly, and further publication illegal and that the scope of the Shuuwa decision
did not cover reverse engineering. See NAKAYAMA, SoFrWARE, supra note 113, at 131-33.
141. See supra Part III.A. ! .
142. HANREI HYAKUSEN, supra note 137, at 60.
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The court in Shuuwa ruled that inevitable intermediate copying for reverse
engineering is an unauthorized reproduction under the Copyright Law and, with-
out justification, such copying is illegal. It clearly stated that both converting
object code into hexadecimal form and disassembling the object code constituted
a reproduction of the plaintiff's object code. The court analyzed each act of the
defendant (including the defendant's dumping and disassembling) and found them
to be unauthorized copying; this formed part of the court's logic leading to its
conclusion, not mere dicta. In fact, the Administrative Department of the Japanese
Supreme Court summarized the holding as follows: the act of disassembling
object code in the ROM of a PC and putting labels and comments on it was
judged to be copying of source code. 143 After stating that the defendant's dumping
and disassembling constituted a reproduction, the court did not consider any
justification for those acts. In sum, dumping and disassembling-inevitable in
reverse engineering-were held to be unauthorized copying.'44
Because of publication and massive reproduction in this case, few disagree
with the conclusion of the decision; however, the court's ruling on intermediate
copies is contradictory to the idea/expression dichotomy. Before the 1985 Amend-
ment, the Japanese software industry was still in its infancy. Prepackaged software
in the market was mostly game software.145 The prevalent issue in Japanese courts
at the time concerned the copyrightabiity of software. Considering the stage of
development of both the software industry and the case law regarding software
in the early 1980s, it is not surprising that the court could not offer a detailed
discussion of software reverse engineering. The current JCL, however, contains
provisions for software. For example, article 10(3) provides an idea/expression
dichotomy in the software context. In 1995, after external pressure halted the
CAA's legislative effort to clarify the issue, observers awaited relevant court
decisions.
5. Halted Japanese Reverse Engineering Initiative
In the mid-1990s, CAA sought the adoption of a provision similar to the EC
Directive that allows reverse engineering at least to the extent required to achieve
interoperability,' 46 but this effort was halted by outside pressure from the United
States. 147 The CAA's effort started in July 1993 by issuing a press release stating
that its Consultative Committee would study: (1) whether the JCL should be
revised to provide for reverse engineering; (2) whether limitations of rights should
143. GYOOSEISAIBANREI GAIKAN 778 (1993).
144. Mr. Keiji Sugiyama and Mr. Yoshikazu Takaishi expressed a similar view. HANREI HYAKU-
SEN, supra note 137, at 61. TAKAISHI, supra at 112.
145. See Correspondence with Professor Katsuya Hirose, Hosei University (1995) (on file with
author).
146. The EC Directive of May 14, 1991 allows reverse engineering when necessary to achieve
interoperability between programs.
147. See BAND & KATOH, supra note 112, at 314-15.
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be expressly stipulated; and (3) what sort of limitations and conditions would be
appropriate. 148 The press release justified the study by pointing to the EC Directive
and the U.S. court decisions that ruled copying associated with reverse engi-
neering is a fair use.
In September 1993, the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations (Kei-
danren), which is similar to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, submitted its com-
ments to the Consultative Committee (Keidanren Submission).1 49 This Keidanren
Submission reflected the opinion of computer hardware manufacturers, not soft-
ware companies. Keidanren is a business association of traditional and large
companies. Neither of the two software trade associations (JISA and JPSA) com-
mented on this matter. Although the Intellectual Property Rights Committee of
the JISA discussed the issue, its term expired before reaching a conclusion. The
Committee was not requested to write a formal report because the matter had
become a political and trade issue, and the content of the Committee's discussion
was not made public (as usual). 150 The JPSA did not comment on the CAA's
attempt because it thought it premature to issue its decision on the issue of reverse
engineering. 151 The CAA's press release and the Keidanren Submission elevated
an obscure intellectual property issue to a trade-related showdown.
Even inside the United States, opinions on reverse engineering had been divided
between proprietary companies and open system companies. For example, the
American Committee for Interoperable Systems to Commerce sent a letter to
Secretary Ron Brown dated November 17, 1993 stating:
Most methods of software reverse engineering, other than disassembly, are non-
controversial within the computer industry. . . Although some may try to draw a
dividing line between the U. S. and Japan on this issue, the actual dividing line is between
primary proprietary companies ... and open system companies. 52
Eventually, however, the U.S. Government took a stance favorable to the proprie-
tary vendors, and put political pressure on the Japanese Government to quash
the CAA's effort.15 3
In May 1994, the Consultative Committee issued its final report that stated
that no conclusion on specific revisions of the Copyright Law at that stage could
148. Id. at 297.
149. It supported disassembly regardless of its purpose. In addition to the U.S. court decisions
and the EC Directive, Keidanren justified its position by arguing that: (1) analysis of computer
programs is crucial for the advancement of science and beneficial to society and as such prevents
"redundant investments in similar technologies;" (2) reverse engineering is generally accepted in
all industries; and (3) prohibiting reverse engineering would result in copyright protection for ideas
properly protectable only by patent and trade secret law. See BAND & KATOH, supra note 112, at
298.
150. See Correspondence with a member of the Intellectual Property Rights Committee of JISA
(June 16 & 17, 1994) (on file with author).
151. Interviews with members of the Illegal Copy/Legal Protection Joint Committee of JPSA
(Mar. 1995).
152. See BAND & KATOH, supra note 112, at 299-307
153. See id. at 299-312.
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be reached and, as a counter-argument to the U.S. Government's position, as-
serted that the level of software protection in Japan was substantially the same
as that in Europe and the United States. 5 4 Thus, the CAA's effort to clarify the
reverse engineering issue was halted and frozen.
6. Structure, Sequence, and Organization (SSO) and User Interfaces
a. Processing Flow
In System Science Corp. v. Toyo Sokki KK (1989), a case involving the algo-
rithm limitation on copyright protection under the JCL, 55 the Tokyo District
Court and the influential Tokyo High Court held that processing flow in a com-
puter program is not protected by the program's copyright.
156
The plaintiff, System Science, developed four programs for biochemical mea-
surements. The defendant admitted copying three programs, except one known
as CA-7 H, and installing them into ROM format for marketing. The defendant
marketed four competing products, each containing a program called CA-9. The
major issue was whether CA-9 was an adaptation of CA-7 II. The High Court
stated:
To decide that a program at issue infringes the copyright in a program work, there
must be creativity in the combination of instructions of the program work. Further,
the combination of the program developed later must be similar to the creative part of
the program work ... [Slymbols that express a program are very limited, and their
system (grammar) is also rigorous. Therefore, in aiming at functioning a computer to
obtain a result more effectively, not a few portions of the combinations of instructions
cannot but be similar. Accordingly, regarding program works, we must determine
copyright infringement with caution. 
157
Creativity does not mean the higher originality standard that German courts
required before the adoption of the EC Software Directive.' 58 It means that origi-
nal, but highly mundane expressions may be unprotected by the JCL.' 59 Professor
Karjala explains, "The analysis might sound more coherent to a Western ear if
undertaken in terms of the idea/expression distinction, coupled with such doc-
trines like the merger of idea and expression and scenes a fair."160
The High Court analyzed the issue as follows:
Hardware performs the functions of measurement mode change, keyboard input, allot-
ment of measurement area and write-in on common memories; what CA-7 II or CA-9
154. See id. at 313-14.
155. See Dennis Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Software in the U.S. and Japan: Part
II, 7 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW 231, 232 (1991) [hereinafter Karjala, Japan].
156. Tokyo High Court decision of June 20, 1989. 1322 HANREUIHOO 138; For the details of
the Tokyo District and High Court decisions, see Karjala, Japan, supra note 155, at 235.
157. 1322 HANREIJIHOO 140.
158. BAND & KATOH, supra note 112, at 291. "[Ilt ... simply means that copyright would
extend only to the unconstrained elements of a work." Id.
159. Karjala, Japan, supra note 155, at 231-32.
160. Id.
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performs is only a printing part; the combination of instructions for the processing
routines after data entry from the processor cannot but be the same due to constraint
by the hardware; CA-7 II and CA-9 adopt a common (standard) combination of instruc-
tions for the processing routines while waiting for the printer; common sense tells the
4100H partition to set the subroutine stack because of the RAM area of [defendant's]
hardware, and; 'processing flow' in a computer program is algorithm, 'kaihoo' under
Article 10(3)-3 of the JCL, which is not protected by copyright. 16' Therefore, creativity
cannot be found in the part of CA-7 II at issue. Further, while CA-7 11 has 12,000
bytes, CA-9 has 763 bytes. Moreover, what System Science asserts as similar between
the two programs are minimal bytes.' 62
Accordingly, the court concluded that the defendant's CA-9 was not an adaptation
of CA-7 II.
Regarding a program that was not literally copied, the Tokyo High Court
opinion showed sharp contrast to the Third Circuit's decision in Whelan Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,l63 which protected SSO. The Japanese courts
took a less protective approach, similar to the 1992 decision by the Second Circuit
in Computer Associates Int'l v. Altai, Inc. ,64 which criticized Whelan and was
followed by many other courts.' 65 The Computer Associates decision excluded
broader structural features of software from copyright protection than the Whelen
decision. The issue was whether, and to what extent, the non-literal elements of
software-such as general flow charts and parameter lists-were protected by
the U.S. Copyright Act. The Second Circuit held that a program must be carefully
separated into copyrightable and uncopyrightable components and that scrutinized
copyrightable parts should be compared with the structure of an allegedly infring-
ing program. Further, the Second Circuit narrowed the scope of copyrightability
of software features. Acknowledging the essentially utilitarian nature of software,
it ruled that copyright did not protect elements dictated by efficiency or external
factors, including hardware specifications and compatibility requirements of other
programs.
161. "The [Tokyo High] court does not clarify just what it means by 'processing flow,' but the
term sounds very much like what the trial court in Whelan defined as expression." Id.
162. 1322 HANREIJIHOO 140 (emphasis added).
163. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
164. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). As of 1990,
Professor Karjala wrote:
[The System Science] decision should be contrasted with Whelan and Apple Computer
v. Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983)] decisions in the United States
... The System Science approach is more closely akin to the analysis of NEC Corp.
v. Intel Corp., 10 USPQ 2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1989), which denied infringement based
on similarities arising out of compatibility or efficiency considerations.
Karjala, Japan, supra note 155, at 238.
165. E.g. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sega
Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). National Educ. Support Sys., Inc.
vs. Autoskill, Inc., 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1993); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus.,
Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993); Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26
F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994) (user interface case).
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b. User Interface
User interface is the design of the video screen and the manner in which
information is presented to users and by which users interact with computers.
Most significantly, it encompasses displays and commands appearing on the
screen.
With regard to user interfaces, Japanese courts protect not only a game program
as a program work, but also its screen displays as a cinematographic work.1
66
It remains unclear whether courts will extend copyright protection for screen
displays beyond the realm of game programs to more functional software. Con-
cerning user interface, little case law exists in Japan. In the 1990s, there have
not been any significant copyright lawsuits in Japan involving software, other
than recent district court decisions centered on the moral right issue in game
software.1 67 Because the United States does not have a general counterpart to
moral rights, those decisions are not explored here.
In the United States on the other hand, the Ninth Circuit held in Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. that the graphical user interface (GUI) of Microsoft's
windows environment did not infringe Apple's copyrights for the user interface
of its Macintosh OS. 68 The court found that most of the allegedly infringing
features of Windows 2.03 and 3.0 were either authorized copying under a license
agreement or unprotected elements. 69 Then, in Lotus v. Borland, the First Circuit
ruled that Lotus 1-2-3's menu command hierarchy was not copyrightable subject
matter because it was a method of operation unprotected under the U.S. Copyright
Act.'70 Because the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the First Circuit decision in
a 4-4 per curiam decision,' 7' the First Circuit decision stands, but the status of
the issue remains unclear.
From the foregoing, it follows that the JCL and case law have provided rela-
tively sufficient protection for software since the 1980s. However, the U.S. courts
stretched the scope of protection by copyright law too broadly, such as in Whelan
v. Jaslow, and then later narrowed the scope. In Japan, the courts did not stretch
copyright protection to SSO; admissibility of reverse engineering remains uncer-
tain although legislative bases exist in the author's opinion. Case law does not
exist regarding copyrightability of user interfaces, except screen displays of game
166. Kumiko Bandou, Video Game-no Eizoo-to Program, HANRaI HYAKUSEN 68-69 (1994 ed.).
See, e.g., Digdug case (Tokyo Dist. Ct. Mar. 8, 1985).
167. Sangokushi case (Tokyo Dist. Ct. July 14, 1995) (on appeal with decision expected March
1999), 1538 HANREI JIH7o 203; see also NEOGEO Game Machine case (Osaka Dist. Ct. July 17,
1997); Tokimeki Memorial case (Osaka Dist. Ct. Nov. 27, 1997) (on appeal with decision expected
February 1999).
168. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995).
169. See id. at 1435, 1442.
170. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 816 (1st Cir. 1994).
171. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
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programs. On the other hand, U.S. circuit court decisions have narrowed the
scope of software protection by copyright. That is, protection stretched to SSO
was narrowed; a reverse engineering was upheld as a fair use, and user interfaces
such as a GUI and a menu command hierarchy were judged not copyrightable. '72
Thus, Japanese copyright law is not significantly less protective of software
when compared with that of the United States. Rather, software protection in
the United States is weaker as far as reverse engineering is concerned. If software
developers seek stronger protection for what is not protected by copyright, they
should pursue protection under patents by meeting higher standards. 73 Further,
in 1997, to meet the current network era, the JCL was amended both to expand
an already-existing author's right concerning interactive transmission '74 and to
make the copyright of a computer program include wire transmission to the public
on the same premises (such as via a local area network or LAN). 175
B. PATENTS ON SOFTWARE-RELATED INVENTIONS IN JAPAN
Interests in patents on software-related inventions (software patents) have
been increasing in both Japan and the United States. The Japanese Patent Law
states that patents are exclusive rights to commercially license the patented
inventions. 176 While a copyright is established when a copyrightable work is
created, patents are granted to applicants after the controlling authority follows
certain procedures. Recently, new guidelines for software-related inventions
were published in both countries. After briefly explaining the development
172. As a whole, an evident trend in the United States is for courts to recognize certain "externali-
ties" such as compatibility, see, e.g., Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710, Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Borland Int'l Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 817 (lst Cir. 1995); functionality, see, e.g., Computer Assocs.,
982 F.2d at 709-10; and industry standarization, see, e.g., 982 F.2d at 710, Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1438 (9th Cir. 1994), Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp.,
960 F.2d 1465, 1472 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 198 (1992), as limiting the scope of protectable
elements of computer programs. Further, some recent decisions applied the fair use doctrine more
broadly to cases involving the copying of functional elements of a program to achieve compatibility.
See David Hayes, A Comprehensive Current Analysis of Software "Look and Feel" Protection, in
THE 9TH ANN. ADVANCED COMPUTER L. INST. Vol. ll at 515, 673, & 676 (Georgetown University
Law Center, March 14-15, 1996).
173. Also, possible protection for user interface should be pursued under design patents. For
example, Microsoft obtained a design patent for a specific combination and order of about 160 icons.
(U.S. Patent No.: Des.341,848; Date of Patent: Nov. 30, 1993). Others can use those icons, but
cannot obtain a design patent on the same combination and order of the icons, according to Stephen
L. Peterson, Esq. of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner in Washington, D.C.
174. Japanese Patent Law art. 23 [hereinafter JPL] ((1) The author has the exclusive right to
make the public transmission of his work (including making his work transmittable in the case of
interactive transmission). (2) The author has the exclusive right to publicly communicate, by means
of a receiving apparatus, his work whose public transmission has been made.)
175. See JPL art. 2 (viibis).
176. See JPL art. 68. On the other hand, in the United States, patents are defined as the right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout or importing
invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
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of software patents in Japan, the scope of such patents in Japan and the United
States will be compared below.
1. Patents on Software-related Inventions in Japan
In Japan, a subject matter must be an "invention,"' 177 and have utility (industri-
ally applicable), novelty, and nonobviousness 78 to be patented. Invention is de-
fined as "the highly advanced creation of technical ideas by which a law of
nature is utilized."'79 Japan uses a first-to-file system, as do most industrialized
countries, excluding the United States. Novelty is lost if the invention is publicly
known or worked in Japan, or described in a publication distributed in Japan or
elsewhere prior to the filing date of the patent application.'8°
In 1995, in response to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
Japan extended its patent term to twenty years from the filing date. Also, a
post-grant opposition system was substituted for a pre-grant opposition system. ' 8'
Then, on February 24, 1998, the Japanese Supreme Court upheld the Doctrine
of Equivalents in the so-called Ball Spline Bearing case.' 2 Further, in 1998,
the Japanese Patent Law was amended to strengthen the system for awarding
damages.'83 Before the amendment, damages were often calculated based on a
normal license fee due to difficulty in proving an infringer's net profit, which
the court considers in estimating damage awards.'" In contrast, the new law
enables a patent holder to prove its damages based on proof of the sales volume
of the infringer and provides for consideration of specific circumstances such as
the parties' competition, regardless of a normal license fee between bona fide
contractors. 1
85
177. JPL art. 2.
178. JPL art. 29. The requirement level of utility is higher than that in the United States. Telephone
Interview with Ken-ichi Hattori, Esq., former JPO Examiner (Mar. 19, 1996).
179. JPL art. 2-(1).
180. JPL art. 29-(1).
181. The effective date of the extended patent term was July 1, 1995 and the post-grant opposition
system was January 1, 1996.
182. Heisei 6 (o) No. 1083/1994. The factors so that the Doctrine of Equivalents is approved
(that is, infringed) include: (1) a different part between the accused art and the patented invention
is not an essential part of the patented invention; (2) substitution of the different part of the accused
art for that of the patented invention, which still performs the same function and has the same effect
as the patented invention; (3) such substitution could be easily conceived by someone of ordinary
skill when the accused art was manufactured; (4) the accused art was not known nor easily conceived
by someone of ordinary skill at the time of the patent application; and (5) there was no special
situation (for example, the accused art was intentionally eliminated from the patent claim during the
patent prosecution).
183. Law No. 51 (1998) (Japan) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1999).
184. Yasukazu Irino, Tokyohouno Ichibuwo Kaeseisuru Houritsuno Gaiyo, NBL 643 (1998).
185. Japanese Patent Law art. 102 (1999). However, punitive damages are not awarded under
the Japanese law and the Japanese Supreme Court refused to enforce punitive damages awarded by
a foreign court in Northcon v. Mansei Kogyo (1997).
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In the late 1980s, the software industry was surprised by the "YES" patent
infringement case, even though they had been interested in patents on software-
related inventions. 186 YES Corporation, which managed the patent on equipment
for budget and storage management, sued twelve companies for patent infringe-
ment.' 7 Several defendants were not manufacturers, but software companies 1
8 8
The patented invention related to "an apparatus for financial management, inven-
tory control or the like comprising a display unit, an input unit, a memory having
various files, an output unit and processing unit having five processing means."
8 9
The case settled, leaving the issue ambiguous.190
Yoshikazu Tani, a Tokyo patent attorney states, "Software patents had already
been granted on systems such as the YES patent by the Japanese Patent Office
(JPO). The YES patent was not a surprise. '"' 9' While this may have been the
case among patent practitioners, many in the software industry were surprised.
This led to the JISA publication, Software Related Prior Art Glossary, to help
the JPO build a prior art database on software-related technology when the JPO
announced the new guidelines in 1993, as discussed below. 1
92
a. Japanese Patent Office Guidelines in 1993 and 1997
The practice of the JPO has more significance than that of the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) because little case law exists in Japan. 193 The demand
for protection of computer software by patents has increased in the 1990s, '94 and
forced the JPO to introduce in June 1993 its new Examination Guidelines for
Computer Software Related Inventions (1993 Guidelines). 195 The 1993 Guidelines
unified the three coexisting standards/guidelines-(1) Examination Standard for
Computer Program Related Inventions (Part I) (December 1975); (2) Examination
Guidelines for Inventions Relating to Microcomputer-Applied Technology (De-
cember 1982); and (3) Examination Method of Computer Software Related Inven-
186. Telephone Interview with Akira Uchinuno, supra note 15.
187. Akira Uchinuno, Legal Protection of Software/Algorithm, in JAPAN-U.S. SYMPOSIUM ON THE
FUTURE OF THE PROTECTION OFSOFTWARE AND ALGORITHMS-A DIALOGUE BETWEEN ENGINEERING
AND LEGAL COMMUNITY 246 n.16 (Mar. 1995).
188. Id.
189. YOSHIKAZU TANI, THE PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE IN JAPAN 14 (AIPLA 19th
Mid-Winter Inst. Working Paper, Jan. 24-27, 1996) [hereinafter TANI]; Uchinuno, supra note 187,
at 246. The patented equipment was to input several basic data on budget and storage through a
common format on the screen, to fill in and update master files and data files, and to create books
and graphs for management by reading necessary data from those files.
190. Id.
191. Telephone Interview with Yoshikazu Tani (Feb. 26, 1996).
192. Telephone Interview with Akira Ogata of JISA (Feb. 29, 1996). The Japanese title is Software
Shuuchi Kanyoo Gijyutsushu. The other reason was the request of the JPO.
193. HIDETAKA AIZAWA, SOFTWARE KANRENHATSUMEI-NO TOKKYOHO-NIYORU HOGO-NO GEN-
joo 73 (SOFTIC 1995).
194. TANI, supra note 189, at 2.
195. JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR INVENTIONS IN SPECIFIC FIELDS
1 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 GUIDELINES].
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tion (Draft) (January 1989)-to employ a new concept from the standpoint of
information processing and hardware resources.'96 The first standard was a gen-
eral one dealing mostly with method claims.' 97 The second guideline dealt with
apparatus claims relating to a chip microcomputer. 98 Under this guideline, for
example, kana-kanji conversion method '99 was granted a patent. 20° The third
method, which supplemented the first standard and the second guideline,2' re-
sponded to the increase in granting of patents on software-related inventions that
would have been rejected under strict application of the first standard and the
second guideline.2 °2 Under the method, many software-related inventions ob-
tained patents.2 3 All of the three standards/guidelines adopted the concept of
"cause and effect relationship.' ,2'04
The 1993 Guidelines instruct: (1) a claim should be considered as a whole in
judging whether it is statutory subject matter; and (2) if the invention as a whole
either (i) utilizes a law of nature in the information processing by the software,
or (ii) utilizes hardware resources, then the invention is considered to utilize
natural laws. °3 The 1993 Guidelines also instruct that description as a product
category or a process category is not relevant to determining the utilization of a
law of nature. 206 The 1993 Guidelines give some examples of statutory inventions,
which were made by modifying patents granted in the past, °7 and state that a
programming language and a program per se are not patentable. °
In February 1997, the JPO issued a new guideline accepting computer-readable
medium with computer programs as a valid patent claim (1997 Guidelines) .209
Thus, the holder of such patent may now assert direct infringement against the
sales of floppy disks and CD-ROMs with such programs, whereas only an asser-
tion of indirect infringement was possible under the 1993 Guidelines. 2'° Thus,
protection of software-related inventions has been strengthened.
196. Id.
197. Id. See also Telephone Interview with Akira Uchinuno, supra note 15.
198. See 1993 GUIDELINES, supra note 195; see also Telephone Interview with Akira Uchinuno,
supra note 15.
199. Conversion method from an input in Japanese alphabet (Kana) to Chinese letters (Kanji).
Japanese sentences consist of Chinese letters and Japanese alphabets.
200. S58-21287, Kenji Ushihisa, Patentable Subject Matter in Japan, SOFTWARE KANRENHATSU-
MEI-NO TOKKYOHO-NIYORU HoGO-No GENJOO 8 (SOFTIC 1995).
201. TANI, supra note 189, at 2.
202. Ushihisa, supra note 200, at 7.
203. Id. at 9.
204. TANI, supra note 189, at 2.
205. Id. at 6.
206. Ushihisa, supra note 200, at 9.
207. Telephone Interview with Yoshikazu Tani, Esq. (Mar. 20, 1996).
208. 1993 GUIDELINES, supra note 195, at 6-7.
209. Computer Software Related Inventions, IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES FOR INVENTIONS IN SPE-
CIFIC FIELDS. This guideline applies to patent applications on and after April 1, 1997. See < http://
www.jpo-miti.go.jp/guide/soft-e.txt. >
210. Software-kanren Tokkyoni Kansuru Chousakenkyuu Houkokusho 109 (SOFTIC, Mar.
1998).
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After the publication of the 1993 Guidelines, applications for software-related
inventions increased dramatically." In Japan, substantive examination com-
mences only upon request for examination,212 which must be filed within seven
years from filing of the application.2 13 Examinations are requested on about sixty
percent of the applications.214 On average, such an examination takes approxi-
mately two years to reach the final action of examiners.2 1 5 At that pace, several
years must elapse in order to observe how the 1993 and 1997 Guidelines will
affect the examination process.
b. Comparison between Japan and the United States
In comparing trends in patent protection covering software-related inventions
in Japan and the United States, an interview with an experienced international
practitioner is an invaluable source because little has accurately been written.
Yoshikazu Tani, Esquire notes:
The scope of patent protection for software-related inventions was not necessarily nar-
rower in Japan than in the U.S. A long time ago, protection was wider in Japan. While
Diamond v. Diehr [1981] was disputed up to the U.S. Supreme Court, Japanese Patent
Office granted patents without any trouble on similar inventions including mathematical
algorithms. Another example is a data structure in files of memory. It has been patentable
subject matter for a long time in Japan; in the U.S., it was not previously accepted.
However, the U.S. Patent Office (PTO) has recently become more supportive of patents
on software-related inventions. Very recently [In re Lowry (1994) and the 1996 PTO
Guidelines], the U.S. PTO has started to accept a data structure in files of memory
as patentable subject matter if the data structure is stored on medium. Concerning
computer-readable medium with computer programs, the U.S. PTO and JPO rejected
them before. Yet, the U.S. PTO has changed its position to accept computer-readable
medium with computer programs under the 1996 PTO Guidelines [incorporating In re
Beauregard (1995)].216
Soon after Mr. Tani made these comments, the JPO began to accept computer-
readable medium with computer programs as statutory inventions pursuant to
the 1997 Guidelines.
Thus, determining which country offered a wider scope of patent protection
for software-related inventions during the 1980s is not a simple task. Resembling
a Venn diagram, each country's scope of the patent protection overlapped that
of the other. By the mid-1990s, the United States clearly offered wider patent
211. More than 10,000 applications are said to be filed per year. Uchinuno, supra note 187, at
246 n. 16 (position paper for the Japan-U.S. Symposium on the Future of the Protection of Software
and Algorithms).
212. JPL art. 48-2.
213. JPL art. 48-3.
214. Telephone Interview with Mr. Hirotsuna Yamashita, Institute of Intellectual Property (Wash.
D.C. office) (July 1995).
215. Telephone Interview with Mr. Hirotsuna Yamashita, Institute of Intellectual Property (Wash.
D.C. office) (Feb. 1996).
216. Telephone Interview with Yoshikazu Tani, supra note 207.
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protection for software-related inventions than Japan, but Japan is now following
in a similar direction.
The foregoing Part III shows that the Japanese laws have provided relatively
sufficient protection217 for software since the 1980s. Japanese protection has
not been significantly different from that in the United States, although the
scope of U.S. copyright and patent protection occasionally changed to a large
extent due to active litigation. Also, both the CAA's triumph over the MITI's
sui generis approach, and the software industry's silence during the CAA's
halted effort in 1994 concerning reverse engineering show, in large part, that
the Japanese software industry has not affected the legal scheme of copyright
protection for software.
IV. Conclusion
Though most of the comparatively larger software companies in the dominant
custom segment are keiretsu software companies, they have not depended upon
implicit contracts with customers within the same keiretsu group since the 1980s.
Even when explicit contracts are executed in Japan, legislation has great signifi-
cance due to the relative simplicity of contracts and the lack of case law. This
is further evidenced by moves of the trade association of custom software compa-
nies in the mid- 1980s toward legislation protecting software. Thus, the dominance
of the custom segment did not necessarily result in weak legislative IP rights
protection.
Significantly, keiretsu software companies, most of which are players in the
custom software segment, do not suffer from a financing problem, thanks to
their creditworthiness, which is based on the social recognition that a key com-
pany/main bank of the same keiretsu group will not let them go bankrupt. Although
strong financial backing is crucial to innovation, especially in the investment-first
and R&D-driven prepackaged software business, Japanese software companies
have difficulty in obtaining financing due to poorly developed venture capital,
a lack of a real NASDAQ-type market, and bank lending that focuses on real
property as collateral. This difference in financial strength has created the discrep-
ancy between the dominant custom segment and the underdeveloped prepackaged
software segment.
Moreover, the keiretsu structure does not always bring sufficient business to
its member software companies. Further, with the ongoing recession, Japanese
companies pay more attention to current profits and cost performance than to
trade relationships with their affiliated keiretsu companies. Consequently,
keiretsu software companies face severe competition both inside and outside the
217. See also Brian G. Strawn, Guide to Japanese Intellectual Property Law, 26 AIPLA Q. J.
58 (1998) ("Japanese law provides extensive protection of intellectual property rights, including
patents and utility models, trademarks and service marks, copyrights, trade names, and industrial
designs.").
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keiretsu. Still, they remain within the keiretsu due to their creditworthiness as
keiretsu companies, but continue to diversify their trade partners, more to the
outside of the keiretsu.
Japanese laws have provided sufficient protection for software since the 1980s,
and have not been significantly different from the scope of protection in the
United States. This has been the case with copyright, which played a major role
in protection of software until recently. Both countries' scope of patent protection
for software-related inventions overlapped with the other's in the 1980s. Though
the United States had trended toward wider patent protection for software-related
inventions than Japan by the mid-1990s, Japan has been following in a similar
direction. However, Japanese IP protection for software did not help Japanese
software companies to attract investment capital.
From the foregoing, the author mostly disagrees with Merges' hypotheses
regarding the Japanese software industry. Concerning a causal link among legisla-
tive IP rights protection in Japan, the underdeveloped prepackaged software seg-
ment, and the keiretsu structure, this author formulates that legislative IP protec-
tion did not help Japanese software companies to obtain strong financial backing,
which is especially crucial to enter and remain innovative in the investment-led
and competitive prepackaged software business. Keiretsu software companies,
which dominate the larger custom software segment, obtain financing easily due
to their creditworthy keiretsu status. This difference has led to the superiority
of the custom segment over the prepackaged segment in Japan.
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Appendix
Keiretsu Influence on Transactions Costs
and Financing Costs







Bargaining costs Monitoring costs
K1-K2 [past] low low low
within the
same keiretsu [present] low* It depends upon Not low, especially re a
bargaining power, large corp. K2
etc. Still low re a software
corp. K2
KX-KY [past] - high Low. KX or non-K candifferent depend upon the
differet monitoring by KY's or
keiretsu K's main bank.
or
non-K-K [present] - It depends. Not low re a large corp.
Still low re a software
corp. KY; K
any corp.-non-K [past & - It depends. -
present]
K: keiretsu company
non-K: not a keiretsu company
-: no effect
* If bank lending is low, information gathering through banks (not through the other keiretsu companies)
decreases; information gathering costs are not necessarily low. However, if B is a software company, low
costs are still the case. "Bargaining costs" here means time and labor spent for contractual negotiations.
Though monitoring costs remain low as far as software companies are concerned, the above change in
bargaining costs has lessened the difference between keiretsu and non-keiretsu companies. Further, as a
flip side to the very recent decrease of cross-shareholdings and more focus on current cost performance
as stated above, costs to monitor trade partners are supposed to have increased within the keiretsu.
2. Keiretsu Companies Financing Costs
Low-easy to obtain financing because of creditworthiness supported by the
implicit social recognition that key companies of the keiretsu will not let a keiretsu
company go bankrupt.

